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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between architecture
and theories of the avant-garde in the critical projects of the
1970s, with a focus on the theories of Peter Bürger and
Manfredo Tafuri.  Both Tafuri and Bürger were writing from
within the context of a radicalized Marxism and were fuelled
by an intellectual pessimism towards the totalizing systems of
cultural production that questioned the role of resistance in
aesthetics and the inability of the historical avant-gardes to
engage within the political and economic fields of
contemporary society.  While there is a common ancestry to
these two approaches, and mutual acceptance of the failure of
the avant-garde project, the work of Tafuri has had an
enduring influence on architectural history and theory, while
Bürger’s synchronous work has attracted only a modest
amount of scholarly attention in architecture despite its
ongoing legacy in art theory and, particularly, within an
American context.  This paper argues that Bürger’s dialectical
approach has a significance for architectural theory and
presents a discursive position through which Marxism and
architecture can be advanced. Through a detailed reading of
these two approaches, the paper attempts to position
architecture as a particular strategy of the avant-garde that
overshadowed all fields of aesthetic production in the period.
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1. Introduction
While aesthetics was among his numerous concerns, Karl Marx
left behind a limited framework from which a theory of art
could be established.  This is even more ill-defined in
relationship to architecture.[1]  As Lambert Zuidervaart wrote,
“[I]t is problematic to speak of the Marxian model [since…]
Marx and Engels never propounded a comprehensive
philosophy of art and their scattered comments on art may
imply more than one such model.”[2] Most attempts to
structure a philosophy of art based on the writings of Marx
assume a distinction between base and superstructure.  For
the most part, this has been the structure that has dominated
the integration of Marx’s work in architectural theory, although
this has been complicated by the diversity of avenues through
which it has been pursued.[3]  For a number of critics in art
and architecture, the distinction between the base and
superstructure is less significant than the methodological
critique of ideology that, in art, is conditioned by the forces of
production and reception.  This distinction is a central theme in
the theories of the avant-garde constructed by Peter Bürger
and Manfredo Tafuri in the 1970s.
By drawing from the dialectical method implicit in the early
criticism of Karl Marx, Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-
Garde argued that the avant-garde is a collection of
accumulated strategies that are assembled in protest against
an entrenched model of cultural production.  Bürger argued
that previous Marxist attempts to theorize art within the
context of bourgeois society, most notably those of Adorno,
Lukacs and Benjamin, have failed to attribute sufficient weight
to the function that art plays within this society and, as a
result, they neglect its sociological contribution.[4]  The
preconception that art has no functional importance is, in
Bürger’s analysis, only countered in the work of Herbert
Marcuse, who saw the function of art as an affirmation of the
values intrinsic to the society in which it is produced.  As a
result, Bürger concluded that the theoretical incursions of both
Benjamin and Adorno[5] remain at the level of a theory of
modernism and are inadequate positions from which to
develop a broader theory of avant-garde practice.  The
emphasis on function that underpins Bürger’s approach has a
natural relationship to architecture and, specifically, the
modernist histories that are inseparable from it.
In contrast, the writings of the architectural historian Manfredo
Tafuri, during the same period, state that it is architecture’s
inherent “functionality” that renders it impotent as a model of
social or political resistance.  If Bürger’s work expressed a
frustration with contemporary practices in the visual arts, then
Tafuri set out to establish a more concrete understanding of
architecture’s relationship to avant-garde processes and the
political implications embedded in them.  For Tafuri,
architecture was torn between the invention of “fantasy”
unbuilt projects as a model of critique and the production of
subversive labyrinthine environments that weave themselves
clandestinely into the cycles of capitalism.  Both were not only
inherently opposed to function but also operated without a
recognizable form or aesthetic “object.”  Tafuri’s influential and
nihilistic position was that the inherent “functionality” of
architecture meant that it would always be governed by
commercial and mainstream social forces.  This made it
ineffective as a medium through which opposition could be
expressed in a material form.  Like Bürger, Tafuri concluded
that it is only through negation that architecture can
participate in provocation or action.
Given this, the significance of these two independent theories
of avant-garde practice in the 1970s is twofold.  First, they
extend the already developed social theories of Adorno,
Lukacs, and Marcuse into a broader theory of artistic
production that is applicable to architecture; and second, they
inspired and virtually re-structured a generation of American
criticism,  predominantly from New York, through the emerging
hegemonies of October, in art, and Oppositions, in
architecture,  respectively.  Within this emerging field of
criticism, architecture is increasingly implicated as a medium
through which avant-garde practices were inadvertently
explored.  
That these two discourses dovetail so closely. both temporally
and ideologically, enables a comparative and expanded model
of avant-garde practice to be theorized in relationship to the
disciplinary boundaries of architectural production, laden as it
is with the pessimism and frustration that accompanied the
derailed Marxist resurgence of the 1970s.  While Tafuri and
Bürger exist in isolated “compartments”[6] in the various
theories of postmodernism, the significance and synchronicity
of their ideas warrant further and more prolonged scholarly
attention.  This paper will contextualize Bürger’s work in
relationship to Tafuri and establish an alternative model
through which architecture and the avant-garde can be
theorized, with particular concern for the Marxist ancestry that
underpins both positions.
2. Social forces in the 1970s
In the introduction to Theory of the Avant-Garde in 1974,
Peter Bürger wrote:
[w]hether they want to or not, historians or
interpreters hold a position in the social disputes
of their time. The perspective from which they
view their subject is determined by the position
they occupy among the social forces of the
epoch.[7]
Like many theorists of the Frankfurt school, Bürger’s theory is
concerned with a much broader historical project that accepts
modernism as paradigmatic and enabling but is pessimistic
about the “cultural machinery” that produces it and
undermines its social efficacy.  A similar “historical” gravitas
underpins Tafuri and has been critical to his legacy as both
theorist and historian.  The decade preceding the initial
publication of both Bürger and Tafuri’s critique of the avant-
garde was one of tumultuous social upheaval. Following his
death in 1969, Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory was
published in German in 1970, although its transition into
English was delayed due to the complexity of the translation
and the widely contested form of the book.[8]  Following from
his post-war essays, Adorno’s work provides an enduring
Marxist critique of the culture industry and a nihilistic appraisal
of culture’s failed opposition towards it.  The publication of
Adorno’s epic work fuelled an influx of research in the German
language that further legitimized art as a valid forum for
investigations in philosophy.
Postmodern architecture, which emerged in America primarily
after the publication of Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction
in Architecture (1963) and the cumulative critiques of post-
war modernism in classic texts, such as Jane Jacobs’s Life and
Death of Great American Cities (1961), was also enhanced
through its ready reception within a commercial marketplace.
 Despite the fact that Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour’s
1972 work, Learning from Las Vegas, originally carried the
subtitle, “The Great Proletarian Cultural Locomotive,”[9]
architecture in this period gravitated towards “populism” rather
than socialism and was concerned more with the visual
preferences of the proletarian rather than their social
emancipation.[10] Frederic Jameson extended this argument
in his Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,
where he drew Jencks and Venturi into a broader Marxist
dialectic, with its antithesis in the “bleakest” and “implacably
negative” critique of Tafuri.  For Jameson, the appeal to
populism in post-modern architecture was a reaction to the
elitist but differentiating and innovative practices of high
modernism, effectively rendering it indiscernible from the
cultural industry of advanced capitalism.
Unlike the Marxist revisionism occurring in related disciplines,
in architecture the period was characterized by a decidedly
non-revolutionary structuralist reappraisal of the kitsch
landscapes of corporate America.  This primarily American
phenomenon meekly interpreted the theoretical motives of
critical theory in the 1960s into a literalist and historicist
consumer pastiche that was readily applied to the surfaces of
American capitalism throughout the 1980s.  The Jencksian
inspired “post-modernism,”[11] even more than conceptual
art, was heavily criticized for its easy appropriation by markwt
capitalism, despite its humanist allegiances as it became the
signature style for corporate towers across the southern states
of America.[12]  
Echoing the broader cultural and intellectual shifts that were
taking place, and not acknowledged in the restrictive
narrowing of Jencks’s post-modernism, the emergence of
architectural theory as a multi-disciplinary critical practice is
often located historically within this approximate period.[13] 
These were anchored by the coincidence of two quite unrelated
trajectories:  Baird’s influential re-reading of Saussure and
architecture (1969)[14] and Tafuri’s polemical rereading of
Marxism and the avant-garde in the same year.[15]  Tafuri’s
radical Marxism was an assault on the mainstream
ineffectiveness of contemporary architecture and led to a
sustained period of theoretical activity that tore at the heart of
the commercial foundations of architecture and the passive
role of the historian in accommodating it.[16] The re-
emergence of Marxism at this time was significant, not just in
the context of Bürger and Tafuri’s work, but also in society at
large. providing a model for reworking historical frameworks
that transformed the critical function of social history.[17]
3. Theory of the Avant-Garde
Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde was different from
previous theories of modern art by its interpretation of the
avant-garde as a historical phenomenon as opposed to an
aesthetic one.  Bürger argued that a process of
institutionalizing art had occurred in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries and this had led to the gentrification
of art and the isolation of its inherently bourgeois
audience.[18]  In this sense, he follows the earlier precedents
of Adorno and Benjamin, who drew a distinction between
“organic” and “nonorganic” artworks:  the former being
associated with the bourgeois structures intrinsic to the
production of art and meaning and the latter with the category
of avant-gardist works characterized by fragmentation and a
collapse of the structures of holistic meaning.[19]  Bürger
maintained that the radical creative approaches of the first
decades of the twentieth century were an attempt to both
identify and dismantle this institutionalization of art, attacking
the bourgeois gentrification of the art process and ultimately
realigning creativity with the experience of modern life.  
In short, the historical avant-garde attacked the autonomy of
the art object and its institutionalization and conflated the
categories of art and life.  Bürger argued that the “neo-avant-
garde” appropriated tactics of the historical avant-garde but in
an emaciated form, no longer challenging the autonomy of art
but actively reinforcing it in a depoliticized and opportunistic
way.[20]  In this sense, the neo-avant-garde had adopted the
techniques of the historical avant-garde but without the
requisite critique of the institution of art and the social
structures that created and fuelled it.
Drawing its methodological approach from the explorations of
Marx and the associated reclamation projects of the Frankfurt
school, Bürger’s theory is situated outside of the discipline of
art history and resides in the multidisciplinary terrain of critical
theory.[21]  Bürger was guarded in his writing about history
and method in his theory of the avant-garde.  He was wary of
the critiques of objectivism common in the 1970s and the
inherently postmodern project to emancipate history from the
constraints of strictly linear and evolutionary narratives.[22]
 Drawing from Gadamer, Bürger stressed the danger of
completely historicizing aesthetic theory to the point where it
is wholly contained within the period of study (the zeitgeist)
and does not allow for subsequent developments of knowledge
to impact on the chosen era.  This leads to what Bürger called
a “false objectivism,”[23] whereby an author is indifferent
towards the specific perspective from which he or she writes.  
The other extreme, against which Bürger also warned, is the
formation of a palimpsest approach, drawn from the
fragmentary accumulation of selected aspects of previous
theories up until the present.  While avoiding some of the
dangers of objectivity, this is prone to becoming the
construction of a “prehistory of the present” but in a selective
and decontextualized manner.[24]  For Bürger, the
historicization of a contemporary aesthetic theory needs to pay
special attention to the categories upon which this analysis
rests and their specific historical relationship to both the
present and the historical subject. In this way, a critical theory
serves to illuminate the structures upon which knowledge is
based and develops a relationship between the historical
categories of knowledge and the critical perspective of the
author. And so Bürger established his debt to Marx and, most
importantly, the relationship between ideology and production,
accepting ideology as produced by social structures rather than
as a direct outcome of them.
Bürger’s discussion of Marx takes as its example the
interrogation of religion that Marx underttook in his Critique of
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, where he scrutinized Hegel’s
definition of truth as “the agreement of an object with our
perception.”[25]  For Marx, criticism has a role in exposing the
inherent contradictions in a social system, as well as the
illusions that disguise its appearance.  In this sense the
relationship between an object and its perception is
conditioned by ideology, and it is the role of criticism to reveal
this relationship.  In the case of religion, the mechanisms of
ideology operate to erect an illusion of religion through objects
at the same time as they construct a psychological consolation
that, at a social level, prevents the forces of social change
gaining any momentum.
Bürger’s resituated theory of avant-garde practice begins with
the historicization of the institution of art oriented around the
phenomena of “aestheticism.”  That, for Bürger,
methodologically resembles the category of “labor” in Marx’s
critique of capitalism.  The phenomenon of the avant-garde
makes visible the historical categories that enable an
unmasking of bourgeois aesthetics, constituting the effective
origin of these new ideological tools.  As Bürger illustrated,
prior to the avant-garde, art was criticized within the
framework of its medium, so that a comedy was assessed and
evaluated against the entrenched categories and expectations
of comedy.[26]  In contrast, Bürger saw the avant-garde
project as the rolling together of all of these independent
historical “means” into a singular strategy so that the
oppositions between them are assimilated.[27]  For Bürger,
the category of artistic means was indiscernible up to the
historical avant-garde.  It was so bound to the conditions of
style that structured art that it was never exposed to a
dialectical or oppositional critique of alternatives; the pervasive
schema of bourgeois criticism ensured that none was
available.  With the evolution of the historical avant-garde, the
aesthetic function of art was annihilated, resulting in the
dissolution of the structures of style and the emergence of new
categories through which “artistic means” had to be evaluated.
 For Bürger, it is
a distinguishing feature of the historical avant-
garde movements that they did not develop a
style.  There is no such thing as a Dadaist or
surrealist style.  What did happen was that these
movements liquidated the possibility of a period
style when they raised to a principle the
availability of the artistic means of past periods.
 Not until there is universal availability does the
category of artistic means become a general
one.[28]
It is this aspect of Bürger’s work that is of profound
significance for architecture.  Instead of  marginalizing
architecture from the historical avant-garde (the conventional
perspective), it enables a correlation between the two, where
architecture, like any other “artistic means,” can be
appropriated towards avant-gardist ends.  It no longer needs
to be contained at the margins of art practice but resides as a
central concern of the historical avant-garde, and sits along
side photography, film, drawing, and collage as a tactic
through which the “stylistic” categories of aesthetics are
dismantled.  Bürger’s writing on means has some
commonalities with Adorno’s critique of functionalism,[29]
where he argued that in architecture the absence of style was
effectively a style itself.  Adorno, who differentiated between
purposeful and non-purposive arts, argued that the lack of
aesthetic content, for example, as pure functionalism, is a
myth, since the expression of functionality is in itself a
style.[30]  For Adorno, architecture is heavily engaged in the
cycles of aesthetics, especially in regard to the need for
aesthetic renewal operating not as an alternative to the visual
arts but in unison with them.  Architecture’s inherent
functionality made it a radical and easily appropriated weapon
in the armory of the avant-garde, capable of nurturing life and
experience but at the same time recontextualizing the
aesthetic qualities of the work of art and negating the
categories attached to these.
While a large amount of critical attention has been devoted to
the neo-avant-garde, the vast majority of Bürger’s short work
is concerned with the machinations of the historical avant-
garde and, more particularly, its evolution in opposition to
bourgeois aestheticism.  Bürger’s argument is that the 1920s
allowed the institution of art to be recognized for the first
time, establishing the vantage point, through avant-garde
practice, from which it also could be critiqued.  The historical
avant-garde revolutionized art practice but was unable to
institute any substantial transformation of the political or
economic structure of capitalism.  For Bürger, the more
contemporary avant-garde practices are limited by the
formulation of this institution of art, which means they no
longer operate in connection with society but within the
dislocated and autonomous structure of this institution,
embodying, in the process, a corrupt art economy.
However, as Buchloh has demonstrated, the nihilistic
assumption that the commodification of art in the 1960s is
chained to the absolute failure of the avant-garde, while
dialectical in its basis, is flawed.[31]  The avant-garde,
constituting a disorganized and anachronistic array of widely
disparate tactics, never intended, or was capable of, a
permanent destruction of the institution of art.  It was, as
Bürger acknowledged, a phenomenon that merely recognized
this “institution” for the first time and then radically attacked
it.[32]  However, the argument that the failure to destroy the
“institution” in the 1920s meant the futility of opposition
forever after is tenuous and, as Buchloh demonstrated,
neglects the important skirmishes between art and its endemic
institutional hegemony that have taken place since.[33]  As
Foster argued, these assaults can only be seen as an
extension of avant-garde activities, even on the basis of
Bürger’s own strictly defined terms and categories.[34]  The
historical avant-garde is not a start and endpoint of opposition
but merely a transformation of the contexts where this
opposition is directed.
4. Architecture and utopia
While Bürger’s thesis set out to diagnose the failure of the
avant-garde project, Tafuri’s writing from the same period
argued that it was architecture’s immersion within capitalist
systems that meant it would always fail as a model of social or
political critique.  First published in English in 1976, Tafuri’s
seminal criticism of the avant-garde project is delivered in
Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist
Development.[35]  The timing of Tafuri’s work is significant,
coinciding roughly with Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde
and the broader cultural resurgence of Marxism that
preoccupied multi-disciplinary explorations in a number of
literary fields.  Viewing architecture through the lens of
ideological criticism,[36] Tafuri lamented the ineffective nature
of ideology against the rationalizing forces of architectural
production, presenting a fatalistic scenario for contemporary
architecture that is characterized by the same negativity with
which Bürger approached the study of contemporary art.  For
Tafuri, as the practice of architecture “deliberately flees
confrontation.”[37]  Either through cooperation with
rationalism or utopian escapism, architectural criticism
assumes an elevated role in evaluating and opposing the
effects of ideology, as well as articulating the inherent
contradictions in the categories through which society is
represented. 
Tafuri’s argument reaches its crescendo in the closing passage
of this work, which, tinged with anger and heartfelt despair,
reads as a eulogy for architecture as it accepts the futility of
its own position.[38]  Having established the inevitable
surrender of contemporary architecture to ideology, Tafuri
argued that the discipline of architecture has “marked its own
fate by making itself, within an autonomous political strategy,
the bearer of ideals of rationalization by which the working
class is affected only in the second instance.”[39]  For Tafuri,
architectural practice was so heavily immersed in the forces of
production that there were no avenues through which it would
be able to affect or disrupt the means of production.  It was, in
its nature, an outcome of production rather than the means to
oppose it. The nihilism of Tafuri is articulated in his tortured
description of this hopeless fate:
[t]he historical inevitability of this phenomenon
can be recognised.  But having been so, it is no
longer possible to hide the ultimate reality which
renders uselessly painful the choices of architects
desperately attached to disciplinary ideologies.
 “Uselessly painful” because it is useless to
struggle for escape when completely enclosed
and confined without an exit.  Indeed, the crisis
of modern architecture is not the result of
“tiredness” or “dissipation.”  It is a crisis of the
ideological function of architecture.[40]
For Tafuri, the implication is clear.  Faced with no other
avenues of practice and operating within a discipline slavishly
and inevitably tied to the forces of production, architecture
can no longer seek comfort in “purely architectural
alternatives”[41] and needs to dismantle the ideological
structures that are internal to it.  Criticism has an important
role to play on this front.  As with Bürger, Tafuri’s method
echoes the early work of Marx, which sets out to dismantle the
illusions pertaining to ideology and bring its operations “into
the light.”  The closing paragraph echoes Marx’s critique of
religion, where dialectical criticism lays bare the inherent
contradictions of ideology.  Attempting to reconcile political
praxis with architecture, Tafuri wrote:
[t]he systematic criticism of the ideologies
accompanying the history of capitalist
development is therefore but one chapter of such
political action.  Today, indeed, the principal task
of ideological criticism is to do away with
impotent and ineffectual myths, which so often
serve as illusions that permit the survival of
anachronistic “hopes in design.”[42]
Tafuri’s critique of the inherent futility of architectural practice
is continued in later works with a specific emphasis on the
avant-garde.[43]  The twin operations of Tafuri’s polemic are
embodied in the rationalist pursuit of the object (the sphere)
and the labyrinthine obsession of the avant-garde to
undermine it.   For Tafuri, both are ineffective practices for
resisting the hegemony of capitalist production and an
extension of the flawed logic of radicality that underpins the
paper architecture of the 1970s.  Despite his scepticism
towards these practices, it is important to illustrate that Dada,
in particular, provided an important conduit in Tafuri’s
dialectic, embodying, in a number of passages, the “chaotic”
avant-garde trajectory that opposed but synthesized with the
rationalizing and homogenizing forces of modernism.  For
Tafuri, Dada represented the most destructive and “anarchic”
of the avant-garde movements, but its tactics were ultimately
assimilated by capitalism:  firstly, as “a means of control for
planning” and, more damagingly, as a precursor to its
advances.  In his dialectical theory, Tafuri argued:
Dada’s ferocious decomposition of the linguistic
material and its opposition to prefiguration [had
resulted in] the sublimation of automatism and
commercialisation of values [that] now spread
through all levels of existence in the advance of
capitalism […]. Dada, by means of the absurd,
demonstrated—without naming it—the necessity
of a plan.[44]
Tafuri’s criticism resembles that of Walter Benjamin, who saw
the primary objective of avant-garde practice as a
transformation in the conditions of production rather than
merely an alteration of its aesthetic or spatial conditions
through experimentation.[45]  Tafuri’s criticism of the avant-
garde was directed primarily towards the Italian avant-garde
of the 1960s and, particularly, the idealism of Archizoom and
Superstudio.[46]  While Tafuri employed a similar construct to
Bürger, where strategies are charted across “historical” and
“neo-”generations,[47] it is clear that Tafuri was cynical about
the redeployment of avant-garde tactics in his time and, more
specifically, under the guise of a political radicality.  Having
established the historical futility of the avant-garde project
and its inability to disrupt the mechanisms of capitalism, Tafuri
disparaged the watering down of these practices and their
eclectic and stylistic redeployment in the contemporary avant-
garde.  Not only is this selective reclamation of the historical
avant-garde opportunistic, it is also a desperate attempt to
redeem the radical practices of art for architecture without a
recognition of the ideological impediments that resist this.
 Tafuri wrote:
[i]t is no wonder, then, that the most strongly felt
condition, today, belongs to those who realise
that, in order to salvage specific values for
architecture, the only course is to make use of
“battle fragments”, that is, to redeploy what has
been discarded on the battlefield that has
witnessed the defeat of the avant-garde.  Thus
the new “knights of purity” advance onto the
scene of the present debate brandishing as
banners the fragments of a utopia that they
themselves cannot confront head on.[48]
As Tafuri correctly observed, the objects and fragments of the
visual practice of the avant-garde were only a by-product of
their experience and its reification through art. This aspect of
avant-garde process was not preserved in the contemporary
avant-garde.  Tafuri rejected the objects of creative practice as
the ineffective production of representation in the face of the
overwhelming experience of modern life.  As Tafuri concluded
in his co-authored work, Modern Architecture, “it was the city,
from whose reality the avant-garde drew its very existence,
which was the real proving ground for all its proposals.”[49]
5. Conclusion
As well as a shared emphasis on experience, there are a
number of overlapping themes in the writing of Tafuri and
Bürger that are of significance for architectural criticism.  Both
draw from a Marxist historical-dialectical method,[50]
positioning architecture or the work of art against the forces of
economic production and ideology that produce it.  Both
authors saw contemporary avant-garde practice as
fundamentally and naively flawed; in the former, restricted to
the production of pictures and, in the latter, immersed within
the institution of art that it seeks to dismantle.  The important
difference between the two positions is that Bürger endowed
the historical avant-garde with positivistic values while for
Tafuri, all avant-garde activity was fundamentally flawed, tied
to a fascination with chaos and, using Picasso and Piranesi as
the spectacular precedents, a doomed model of critical
activity.  Of equal importance, where Bürger preserved the
distinction between avant-garde practice and modernism,
Tafuri conflated the two.  As David Cunningham has observed,
in the theory of Tafuri
[a]ll possibility of an avant-garde was completely
sublated within the modernist “ideology of the
plan” and any attempt to re-activate it is at best
a kind of futile nostalgia which fails to understand
“historically the road travelled.”[51]
Where Tafuri preferred to view these experiments as bound to
the ultimately failed avant-garde project of the last two
centuries, Bürger saw a dynamic and radical effect in the
processes of the historical avant-garde that was only
miscarried in its subsequent appropriation by the neo-avant-
garde.  As a result, Bürger’s treatise is not a theory of art but
a theory of avant-garde practice that ultimately is
transferrable to the production of architecture.  It is important
to acknowledge the insight in Tafuri’s writing that avant-garde
practice has an inherent detachment from the real world of
experience or action and, as a result, is limited and
marginalized in its effects.  Characteristic of Bürger’s Theory of
the Avant-Garde is the sublation of art and life that, rather
than displacing art into the realm of the “hypothetical,” firmly
entrenches the avant-garde within real world experience and
institutional critique.  While central to this thesis, the extent to
which Bürger romanticizes and oversimplifies avant-garde
practice in this way is a point of contention,[52] and Tafuri’s
scepticism towards the representational nature and intangible
outcomes of these practices was well-founded.  It is also
apparent that the artistic practices that lie at the heart of
Bürger’s theory, such as collage, montage, and the
readymade, are far more susceptible to Tafuri’s critique of
representation over experience than the architectural projects
against which it was initially directed.
For Iain Boyd Whyte, once the provocations of the avant-
garde are met with ambivalence rather than shock, the end of
its influence is near.[53]  The immersion of architecture and
art as economic strategies, regardless of their oppositional
intentions, has radically transformed the critical theory of art
and suggests that the potential of avant-gardism as a creative
strategy has entered a new historical epoch.  As Jameson has
observed, “it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to
imagine the end of capitalism.”[54]  
The radical transformations of the twentieth century are so
substantial in nature and irrevocable in influence that they
have consumed and appropriated the historical forces of
opposition.  The result is that new modes of engagement need
to be established in both criticism and practice.  The reality, as
Tafuri illustrated, is that architectural practice, regardless of its
aspirations, is so immersed in the forces of production and the
systems of capitalism that it is only capable of subversive
reform rather than meaningful or revolutionary change.  Of
equal significance is that architects have no control whatsoever
over the forces of production that shape cities and control
economies.  The only avant-garde tactics available to
architecture are through the independent forums of publication
and, as a result, representation.  
Clearly, certain practices are capable of greater subversion
than others, and representation, for architecture, enables the
greatest possible field of influence in the contemporary
context.  The positions of both Tafuri and Bürger represent the
failures of the neo-avant-garde in absolutist terms and neglect
the important media transformations that the formative
practices of the neo-avant-garde in architecture have initiated,
in addition to the role they may play in establishing models for
future opposition or subterfuge. Through the disruption of
“function” and the emergence of “dysfunction” as a spatial
strategy aligned to contemporary reality, the critical legacy of
both Tafuri and Bürger can be assimilated with the next stage
of avant-garde provocation.
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